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SALVAGE project
T
he purpose of the SALVAGE project is to develop better support for managing and
designing a secure future smart grid. This approach includes cyber security technologies
dedicated to power grid operation as well as support for the migration to the future smart
grid solutions, including the legacy of ICT that necessarily will be part of it. The objective is
further to develop cyber security technology and methodology optimized with the particular
needs and context of the power industry, something that is to a large extent lacking in general
cyber security best practices and technologies today. In particular the focus of the project will
be on smart grid with many small distributed energy resources, in particular LV substation
automation systems and LV distribution system.
Scope of the report: This report presents developed model-based anomaly detection tech-
niques used for intrusion detection in smart grid.
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1 Intrusion detection system (IDS)
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) gather and analyze the information from a computer network
or a system in order to discover malicious activities or violations of policy [1]. Two general
types of detection techniques are used in IDS: anomaly-based or signature-based. Current IDS
focus on the analysis of software and network traffic, but do not usually take the physical
component of a cyber-physical system into consideration.An IDS that is well suited for the
application in smart grids needs to address both on-line and post-mortem analysis of the state
of the observed cyber-physical system and detect anomalies in operation of both cyber and
physical components [2].
1.1 SALVAGE approach to IDS
The cyber-physical IDS architecture proposed in the SALVAGE project consists of two main
parts: an analysis of the behavior of the observed cyber-physical system and components, and
a joint analysis of the cyber-physical system 1. The behavior analysis and characterization
of the physical power system is performed with two components: DER and power system
analysis, the evaluation of the cyber vulnerabilities is performed in the cyber security analysis
component. The joint cyber-physical analysis combines the information from both physical and
cyber security components and presents the outcomes to the power system operator.
Figure 1: Architecture of the cyber-physical intrusion detection system
The main building blocks of the architecture: DER, power system and cyber-security analysis
use models of the part of the observed system and live or historical measurements to each
perform their partial analysis. The information exchange between the IDS components is as
follows:
(a) DER behavior models (producers, consumers and prosumers);
(b) measurements from DERs (includes smart meter measurement);
(c) power grid model or state estimation;
(d) power grid measurements;
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(e) model of the ICT infrastructure (e.g., field devices, communication networks, instances of
data communication, control systems, and information systems of different kind);
(f) ICT attack indicators – real (e.g., real-time warnings and alerts from a security information
and event management (SIEM) system), and/or assumptions about the presence of the
attacker;
(g) vector of probability of the DER being compromised;
(h) vector of power system state or risk assessment;
(i) vector of time-to-compromise for top 5%, 50% and 90% of the generally assumed population
of attackers, whose skills correspond to the skills of professional penetration testers;
(j) attack assumptions for automated evaluation of multiple scenarios, enabling the validation
of multiple hypotheses;
(k) assessment of the cyber-physical system state, including a list of investigated problems
and details supporting each hypotheses.
The initial SALVAGE IDS system had a unidirectional structure, where DER, power system
and cyber-security analysis was fed forward to the cyber physical analysis component. With
time the architecture was extended with the return loop from the cyber-physical analysis
component back to the DER, power system and cyber-security analysis components (see arrow
(j) in figure 1). The extended architecture supports the idea of a hypothesis testing approach to
cyber-physical security. A similar approach is currently being instigated in the cyber-security
research. The University of Illinois investigates Network Hypothesis Testing Methodology
(NetHTM) 1, a set of techniques for performing and integrating security analyses applied at
different network layers, in different ways, to pose and rigorously answer quantitative hypotheses
about the end-to-end security of a network. In SALVAGE we investigate a set of hypotheses
for a defined purpose of the cyber-physical power system attack. For example in the paper
presented in section 4.1 we test the hypothesis that DERs maliciously influence the voltage in
the low voltage distribution feeder.
The different parts of the entire cyber-physical IDS as depicted in figure 1 perform each a
different type of analysis. The function of the DER analysis module is described below in this
document.
The module for power system analysis performs load flow based calculations from electrical
measurements (e.g., from substations and/or smart meters). This provides information about
how safely the different parts of the electrical grid operate (i.e., how close to their margins),
which further enables the consideration of (1) how sensitive each part of the network is to a
particular attack, (2) what attack might be currently ongoing given the state of the power grid,
and (3) which attacks might be particularly harmful to the power grid given its state. All of
these three considerations, which happen on the higher level of the module for cyber-physical
analysis, allow the module to evaluate and further formulate hypotheses, adjust the assumptions
(see arrow (j) in figure 1), and manage the entire intrusion detection process.
The module for cyber-security analysis performs a probabilistic simulation of cyber attacks
within the IT infrastructure that exists alongside the physical infrastructure of the power grid,
1(online April 2016) http://publish.illinois.edu/science-of-security-lablet/ hypothesis-testing-for-network-
security/
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and in the cyber-neighborhood of it. In order for the module to simulate cyber-attacks, a
comprehensive model of the IT infrastructure is used together with security information and
assumptions (in likeness with the model of a power grid used together with power measurements
in order to calculate load flow). A brief overview of the IT model is depicted in figure 2. The
Figure 2: A brief conceptual overview of the IT model
security information can be indications from a SIEM system, which are then transformed into
security assumptions and embedded into the IT model prior to a simulation. The term security
assumptions covers the following: (1) the placement of the attacker in the IT infrastructure (i.e.,
what does the attacker have access to, what components has the attacker compromised and in
what way); (2) any modifications [to the baseline model] of the set of cyber-components modeled
and their interconnections; (3) any modifications [to the baseline model] of the properties (i.e.,
parameters) of the different modeled cyber-components (e.g., operating systems, routers,
software applications, security management processes) that are found to have significance to the
ease with which an attacker can compromise them given different prerequisites; and hence the
overall cyber-security. Examples of these properties are the use of data execution prevention
on an operating system using a processor with Intel x86/x64 architecture; the use of rigorous
security patching process or system hardening process for cyber-components in a given network
segment; or the fact that a software has been subject to significant security scrutiny during
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its development (i.e., thorough security reviews and testing). The information the module
for cyber-security analysis provides, is a reachability map across the entire IT-infrastructure,
evaluating the distribution of time it would take the attacker to compromise each reachable
cyber-component, in each reachable mode of compromise defined for it. This further enables the
consideration of (1) what components might be compromised and so cause physical disturbances
to the power grid; (2) what cyber-components are highly vulnerable and so potentially next-in-
line to be compromised, given a set of assumptions. Similarly as with the module for power
system analysis, these two considerations happen on the level of the module for cyber-physical
analysis, which combines the information from the cyber-security analysis together with that of
power system analysis and DER analysis, in order to evaluate and further formulate hypotheses,
adjust assumptions, and manage the entire intrusion detection process.
2 Model based anomaly detection
Chandola [3] defines anomalies as “patterns in data that do not conform to a well defined notion
of normal behavior”. Anomaly detection is a method of discovering anomalies and can be
divided into three types: supervised, semi-supervised, unsupervised. Supervised methods use a
fully labelled training set to train a classification method which distinguishes normal behaviour
from different types of anomalies. Semi-supervised methods (so called model-based anomaly
detection) use partially labelled data to create a model of normal behaviour and compare the
model output to the observed network or system behaviour. Unsupervised methods assume that
the total number of anomalies is small in comparison to the normal data points in the training
set. Based on this assumption, statistical anomaly based techniques analyze operational data
in order to distinguish between normal and anomalous operation through statistical inference
tests. The results or anomaly detection are either labels (classes) or scores (numerical).
Three categories of anomaly detection can be distinguished: point, contextual and collective.
The point anomaly detection takes the global view of the data [3]. The contextual or conditional
anomalies were introduced in [4] and are defined as data points that are anomalous in a specific
context and acceptable in another context. The collective anomaly appears when a related
data instances are anomalous with respect to the entire data set. In this case a sequence or a
simultaneous occurrence of events or data points is unusual, but the appearance of a single
event or data point is not anomalous.
In SALVAGE we have investigated contextual model-based anomaly detection for DER
analysis, this research was based on classical and ensemble model-based anomaly detection.
2.1 Classical model-based anomaly detection
In the classical model-based anomaly detection method, normal DER behaviour is modelled
in the DER model component (figure 3). The output of the model is compared to sensor
measurements (or target data) in the Anomaly Detection component. Differences between
normal and observed DER behaviour can originate form several sources: sensor error, model
error, DER fault, or malicious or verified DER control. The output of the model-based anomaly
detection is either a label (class) or an anomaly score for every data input.
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Figure 3: Flow diagram of the model-based anomaly detection
2.2 Ensemble model-based anomaly detection
Ensemble learning combines several models to produce a prediction to solve classification and
regression problems [5]. The increased robustness and accuracy of ensemble methods over
single model methods was reported in [6]. Ensemble learning consists of three steps: generation,
pruning and integration. First several redundant models are generated, then the set of models is
pruned by removing some of the generated models, finally the base model results are combined
to create the ensemble prediction [5]. An overview of ensemble regression approaches for
generation, pruning and integration are presented in [5]. The ensemble is evaluated by the
degree of agreement between predictions represented by their overall spread. The ensemble
prediction is usually evaluated in terms of an average of the individual predictions (mostly
using equal weight averaging).
Figure 4: Ensemble model-based anomaly detection architecture.
The ensemble model-based anomaly detection (EM-AD) uses two or more DER normal
behaviour models which produce the same output variables based on disjoint sets of inputs. The
additional Model merging component calculates the final model output that is next compared
to the observed output in the Anomaly detection component.
3 Model-based anomaly detection in SALVAGE IDS
3.1 On-line
In the on-line model-based anomaly detection a hypothesis or a test hypothesis is tested on
the current state of the observed system. The current state can be partially measured and
estimated with use of a model. The measurement and estimation of the same value or a state
is being compared to find anomalies, Additionally comparison of historical and current states
can be performed in order to determine the state transition. For example in work presented in
section 4.1 we compare historical and current voltage state in order to determine if the influence
of the control signal is malicious or aiding.
3.2 Off-line (post-mortem)
The investigated post-mortem model-based anomaly detection consist of two steps. First the
semi-supervised normal model is trained with use of historical data. In this step a normal
model of the system should be inferred form the data. There are several ways to obtain the
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training data: semi-supervised and unsupervised approach. In the semi-supervised approach
the historical data can be labeled in order to extract the normal model, this can be done with
use of known characteristic of the normal behaviour for example a correlation between model
inputs and outputs. In this case the data is filtered and a subset is used to train the normal
model. In the unsupervised approach, it is assumed that most of samples are representing the
normal behaviour and a small set of outliers represent the anomaly. Statistical models can be
used to model normal behaviour. The second step of the post-mortem model-based anomaly
detection is the analysis of the historical data with use of the normal model calculated in the
previous step. In this step model based anomaly detection is performed on the historical data
set.
3.3 Tools used for method validation
3.3.1 Simulation
In order to simulate the measurements form the physical system we have used a co-simulation
setup with load flow simulation (PyPower2), load and production simulators (mosaik-csv3)
with real data form Pecan Street project 4. Simulations are managed by the co-simulation
orchestrator mosaik 5. This co-simulation setup was presented in paper form section 4.1.
3.3.2 Demonstration
The demonstration presented in section 5.1 was done in SYSLAB DTU laboratory. The software
was written in Java and trained models are executed with R scripts executed form Java code.
For cyber analysis, the software uses alerts form OPC UA server implementation in SYSLAB.
3.3.3 Analysis
Data analysis was performed with R, all ANN models were trained with use of nnet package
[7]. The analysis was used in papers from sections 4.1 and 4.2, and work in progress presented
in section 5.1.
4 Published papers
4.1 Contextual anomaly detection for cyber-physical security in Smart Grids
based on an artificial neural network model
Authors: Anna Magdalena Kosek, Energy System Operation and Management, Department
of Electrical Engineering, Technical University of Denmark
Publication: 2016 Joint Workshop on Cyber-Physical Security and Resilience in Smart Grids
(CPSR-SG2016) part of Cyber Physical Systems week 2016 (CPSweek 2016) April 2016
2https://github.com/rwl/PYPOWER
3https://bitbucket.org/mosaik/mosaik-csv
4http://www.pecanstreet.org/
5http://mosaik.offis.de/
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Abstract: This paper presents a contextual anomaly detection method and its use in the
discovery of malicious voltage control actions in the low voltage distribution grid. The model-
based anomaly detection uses an artificial neural network model to identify a distributed energy
resource’s behavior under control. An intrusion detection system observes distributed energy
resource’s behavior, control actions and the power system impact, and is tested together with
an ongoing voltage control attack in a co-simulation set-up. The simulation results obtained
with a real photo-voltaic rooftop power plant data show that the contextual anomaly detection
performs on average 55% better in the control detection and over 56% better in the malicious
control detection over the point anomaly detection.
Full text: Appendix B
4.2 Ensemble Regression Model-Based Anomaly Detection for Cyber-Physical
Intrusion Detection in Smart Grids
Authors: Anna Magdalena Kosek and Oliver Gehrke, Energy System Operation and Manage-
ment, Department of Electrical Engineering, Technical University of Denmark
Publication: 2016 IEEE Electrical Power and Energy Conference
Abstract: The shift from centralized large production to distributed energy production has
several consequences for current power system operation. The replacement of large power plants
by growing numbers of distributed energy resources (DERs) increases the dependency of the
power system on small scale, distributed production. Many of these DERs can be accessed and
controlled remotely, posing a cybersecurity risk. This paper investigates an intrusion detection
system which evaluates the DER operation in order to discover unauthorized control actions.
The proposed anomaly detection method is based on an ensemble of non-linear artificial neural
network DER models which detect and evaluate anomalies in DER operation. The proposed
method is validated against measurement data which yields a precision of 0.947 and an accuracy
of 0.976. This improves the precision and accuracy of a classic model-based anomaly detection
by 75.7% and 9.2%, respectively.
Full text: Appendix B
5 Work in progress
Two anomaly detection methods are currently being developed in WP2 of the SALVAGE
project. The first laboratory demonstration uses regression and classification models in an
on-line method that detects data integrity anomalies form a PV inverter (section 5.1). The
second uses data form EcoGrid project to determine anomalies in the price response of family
houses in the demand side management experiment (section5.2).
5.1 OPC UA data integrity monitor for DERs
In this work a first version of the on-line data integrity monitor was created for a PV plant
with an OPCUA interface. The cyber-attack target is integrity of the data produced by the PV
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plant. The attack investigated in this work was modification of PV set-point value or active
power production. We considered data in transit integrity. The developed monitor uses the data
produced by the OPC UA server and additionally meteorological data and measurement from
an independent active power mater. The preliminary architecture of the monitor is presented
in figure 5.
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Figure 5: OPCUA PV monitor architecture.
The components of the architecture are as follows:
• Met Srvr is a meteorological server near by the investigated PV plant providing temper-
ature (temp), solar irradiance (irr), wind speed (ws) and wind direction (wd).
• Inv Srvr is a OPCUA server providing power measurement of the PV inverter, in this
work we only consider active power measurement (pInv) and active power set-point that
the PV is following (spInv).
• OPCUA Srvr is a OPCUA server providing OPCUA specific security events, for example
new client connection, authentication status, requested data and modified data. These
alerts and events are being aggregated and the OPCUA PV monitor calculates the total
current number of connected clients (noCCtrl), the number of connected authenticated
controllers (noACtrl) and the last set-point set by any controller (spCtrl).
• Subst Srvr is a substation server provided the independent power measurement from
the PV inverter at the point of common coupling. The OPCUA PV monitor reads only
active power measurement (pSubst).
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• nNorm is a PV normal model component that takes hour-of-the day (hour) calculated
form the computer host local time (hour), temperature (temp), solar irradiance (irr),
wind speed (ws) and wind direction (wd) and outputs predicted active power production
of the PV (pMNorm).
• nCtrl is a PV normal behaviour with control model component that takes hour-of-the
day (hour) calculated form the computer host local time (hour), temperature (temp),
solar irradiance (irr), wind speed (ws), wind direction (wd) and inverter setpoint (spInv)
and outputs predicted active power production of the PV in the context of the control
signal (pMCtrl).
• AnomalyDetection is a classification model that inputs normal power prediction (pM-
Norm), normal power prediction in the context of control (pMCtrl), PV power measured
by the inverter (pInv), the total current number of connected clients (noCCtrl), the
number of connected authenticated controllers (noACtrl), the last set-point set by any con-
troller (spCtrl) and active power measurement at the common point of coupling (pSubst).
The model outputs the probability for each class of anomaly: Normal, Controlled and
Malicious (aNorm, aCtrl, aMlcs).
5.1.1 PV normal model
The PV plant normal model inputs are: solar irradiance [kW/m2] (irr), wind speed [m/s]
(ws), wind direction [deg] (wd),and hour of the day (hour). The model output is active power
production [kW ] (power). The input significance analysis of the linear model based on the
same inputs and outputs as the presented model, using test statistics under the null hypothesis,
shows that all inputs are significant. The training data set consisted of 1 second measurement
from a PV at SYSLAB, DTU Risø Campus from June 2016. An overview of the training data
is presented in figure 6. The set consists of several days of data, the missing days: 3rd, 7th and
8th of June does not influence the model quality.
Artificial neural network (ANN) was used to model the normal behaviour of the PV plant.
Package nnet for R was used to calculate the feed-forward neural networks with a single hidden
layer [7]. In order to determine the number of the hidden neurons in the ANN, ten models of 1
to 20 hidden neurons were trained, comparison of their normalised RMSE (root mean squared
error) is presented in figure 7.
The used ANN consists of 4 inputs, 10 hidden neurons, bias unit and one output. The formula
to train the neural network, as described below, uses regularization parameter decay = 0.0006.
The data set used to train the ANN was normalised in order to improve the model accuracy.
nnet . formula ( formula = pInv ˜ i r r + hour + ws + wd, data = dataN ,
s i z e = 10 , decay = 6e−04, maxit = . Machine$integer . max)
The residuals obtained form the model are presented in fig 8. The obtained RMSE is
0.9589178. The graphical representation of the mapping between model inputs and outputs is
presented in figure 9.
5.1.2 Controllable PV normal model
A complex controllable PV model was replaced with a simple model that inputs the output
of the normal model active power production [kW ] (power) and inverter set-point (spInv)
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Figure 6: Normal model training data.
and outputs predicted active power production of the PV in the context of the control signal
(pMCtrl). In the controllable PV normal model if the estimated power is higher that set-point,
then the model outputs the set-point, otherwise it outputs the estimated power. The difference
between measured power, power estimated form normal and controllable PV normal models
are presented in figure 10
5.1.3 Investigated attacks
The objective of the considered attacks is data integrity while performing control on a PV plant.
The general idea is that the monitor would discover if the PV is being controlled and at the
same time the data reported form the PV inverter is being actively modified in order to hide
the effect or presence of the malicious control actions. Seven attacks were considered in this
scenario:
• the set-point data is being modified in order to hide the control action:
– Attack A1 set-points (spInv and spCtrl) are modified to 110%
– Attack A2 set-points (spInv and spCtrl) are modified to 90%
– Attack A3 set-points (spInv and spCtrl) removed
• OPCUA client authentication and registration in OPC UA server can be removed in
order to hide that the external client is controlling the PV plant.
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Figure 7: RMSE of the hidden layer neurons ANN training sessions (from 1 to 20 neurons).
Figure 8: Histogram of the normal model’s residuals.
– Attack A4 authentication removed
– Attack A5 authentication and client registration removed
• modification of the power production data
– Attack A6 active power production pInv modified 110%
– Attack A7 active power production pInv modified 90%
In practice attacks A4 and A are difficult to execute on the OPCUA server due to its security
features, hoverer the delivery of the alert could be delayed or the message could be lost in
transit. Additionally the integrity of the event message could be compromised in transit.
5.1.4 Anomaly-Detection model trained with synthetic attack data
The training data set for the AnomalyDetection model consisted of 1 second measurement
from a PV at SYSLAB, DTU Risø Campus from 22-24 June 2016. The PV data was modified
to introduce different attacks 5.1.3. The classification model can output either a score- the
probability for each class of anomaly: Normal, Controlled and Malicious, or a label - the
anomaly class (labels: Normal, Controlled and Malicious).
In order to determine best type of the classification model from nnet package [7] for the
investigated problem, several models were trained and their confusion matrix, accuracy, precision
and sensitivity are used to choose the model type, as presented in table 1.
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Figure 9: Model’s prediction compared to the expected output for each input.
Figure 10: Comparison of the PV normal and Controllable PV normal models. Set point is the control
signal that the PV is following, and the model difference is the the diference between normal
and controller model.
The confusion matrix, as described by Fawcett in [8], is a compilation of instances of true
positives (TP), true negatives (TN), false positives (FP) and false negatives (FN), evaluated from
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Table 1: Confusion matrix of the AnomalyDetection model trained with real data.
Algorithm Class TP TN FN FP SEN ACC PREC
log-linear Normal 23497 211859 0 0 1.000 1.000 1.000
Controlled 6 208683 26592 75 0.000 0.887 0.074
Malicious 185186 23503 75 26592 1.000 0.887 0.874
softmax Normal 23497 211859 0 0 1 1 1
Controlled 15282 208654 11316 104 0.575 0.951 0.993
Malicious 185157 38779 104 11316 0.999 0.951 0.942
softmaxSkip Normal 23497 211859 0 0 1 1 1
Controlled 15140 208314 11458 444 0.569 0.949 0.972
Malicious 184817 38637 444 11458 0.998 0.949 0.942
entropy Normal 0 211859 23497 211859 0 0.474 0
Controlled 26598 208758 26598 185261 0.5 0.526 0.126
Malicious 185261 50095 185261 26598 0.5 0.526 0.874
entropySkip Normal 0 197761 23497 211850 0 0.457 0
Controlled 12782 208758 26598 184970 0.325 0.512 0.065
Malicious 184970 50095 185261 12782 0.500 0.543 0.935
lout Normal 0 18181 127071 1667 0 0.124 0
Controlled 0 144567 2352 0 0 0.984 -
Malicious 0 129423 17496 0 0 0.881 -
logit Controlled 0 48189 784 0 0 0.984 -
Malicious 4184 42357 1648 784 0.717 0.950 0.842
a population of results. To measure the correctness of the anomaly detection we calculate three
significance measures: accuracy (ACC), precision (PREC) and sensitivity (SEN). Accuracy is a
description of random errors, precision is the fraction of predicted instances that are relevant
and sensitivity (also called recall) is the fraction of predicted instances that are retrieved.
Accuracy, precision and sensitivity are calculated as follows:
ACC =
TP + TN
TP + FP + FN + TN
PREC =
TP
TP + FP
SEN =
TP
TP + FN
Several supervised classification methods were considered in order to train the AnomalyDe-
tection model. The types of investigated classification models:
• log-linear: fitting multinomial log-linear models with use of artificial neural networks,
using multinorm function from nnet R package
• logit: logistic regression is calculated with glm R function. Logistic regression can be
calculated only for two classes, therefore class Normal and Controlled were combined.
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• softmax: feed-forward neural network using softmax function as activation function in
the output layer
• softmaxSkip: recurrent neural network using softmax function as activation function in
the output layer
• entropy: feed-forward neural network using maximum conditional likelihood (east-
squares) used for training
• entropySkip: recurrent neural network using maximum conditional likelihood (east-
squares) used for training
• lout: feed-forward neural network using linear function as activation function in the
output layer.
The confusion matrix, sensitivity, precision ad accuracy scores for each model are presented
in table 1. Neural network model has a single hidden layer with 10 neurons, regularization
parameter is set to decay = 0.0004. In the case when precision cannot be calculated the sum of
TP and FP is equal to zero.
As seen in table 1, simple logit and lout models perform badly with identifying true positives
in the data. Both entropy and entropySkip models recognize Controlled and Malicious classes
with 0.512 to 0.543 accuracy but score low on sensitivity and precision. The log-linear model
recognises well the Normal behaviour, but number of false-negatives for Controlled and false-
positive for Malicious behaviours is alarmingly high. The softmax model performs best with
only low score for sensitivity in the Controlled class of 0.575. Changing the ANN to a recurrent
does not improve sensitivity precision and accuracy, therefore in this work we have decided to
use the softmax model for the anomaly detection.
5.1.5 Anomaly Detection model with real attack data
The same ANN network as presented in section 5.1.4: ANN model with a single hidden layer
with 10 neurons, regularization parameter set to decay = 0.0004 was used in this section. In this
case the model was trained with data from the SYSLAB laboratory, with attacks as described
in section 5.1.3.
Table 2: Test and Validation set class samples
Set Normal Controlled Malicious Total
Training 2856 350 662 3868
Validation 1318 459 456 2233
The properties of the training and the validation data sets are presented in table 2. The
training set consists of recorded labelled data from 2016-08-24, 2016-08-19, 2016-07-08, and
2016-08-25 (date format yyyy-mm-dd) and the validation data from 2016-08-26. The number of
attack cycles of a length of around 1 minute for each attack type are presented in table 3.
The ANN model developed on a random sample of size of 80% of the training set and tested
with a random sample of size of 20% of the training set, the results of testing different ANN
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Table 3: Test and Validation set attack samples
Set No attack A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 Total
Training 3207 64 129 160 90 69 73 76 3868
Validation 1777 94 43 82 49 1 43 144 2233
types are presented in table 4. It is clearly visible that softmax model achieves the highest
sensitivity, precision and accuracy.
The selected soft-max ANN model was used in the intrusion detection system as presented
in figure 5. The overall results for the soft-max ANN model are sensitivity of 0.627, accuracy
of 0.915 and precision of 0.935 (as seen in table 4). When the prediction for every attack
is considered (as shown in table 5), the lowest sensitivity is observed for attack A1 and A7,
while the accuracy and precision is between 0.912 and 1. The sensitivity measures how many
relevant samples are selected, in other words how complete the results of the prediction are.
The sensitivity can also be treated as probability that a randomly selected relevant sample is
retrieved in a search. The different sensitivity measures for each attack recognition points to
an issue that the model represents some attacks better than other and therefore recognises
relevant samples better.
5.1.6 Conclusions
The proposed intrusion detection system uses information form the PV power production,
meteorological conditions and cyber-security events to discover cyber attacks on the PV
operation. The proposed method was verified with experimental data. Further improvements
of the method mainly focus on the model improvements to decrease the method sensitivity
in the attack recognition. ¡in order to achieve this improvement, more varied attack data is
required for the model training. Additional long therm monitoring tests are needed to asses
the repeatability of results presented in this report and applicability of the developed model to
fall, winter and spring seasons.
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Table 4: Confusion matrix of the AnomalyDetection model with real attack data
Algorithm Class TP TN FN FP SEN ACC PREC
softmax Normal 1318 901 0 14 1.000 0.994 0.989
Controlled 439 1618 20 156 0.956 0.921 0.738
Malicious 286 1757 170 20 0.627 0.915 0.935
softmaxSkip Normal 982 276 633 342 0.608 0.563 0.742
Controlled 46 1589 119 479 0.279 0.732 0.088
Malicious 79 1475 374 305 0.174 0.696 0.206
entropy Normal 633 468 1270 275 0.333 0.416 0.697
Controlled 39 2068 165 374 0.191 0.796 0.094
Malicious 86 1780 453 327 0.160 0.705 0.208
entropySkip Normal 623 508 1356 270 0.315 0.410 0.698
Controlled 37 2068 165 487 0.183 0.764 0.071
Malicious 123 1780 453 401 0.214 0.690 0.235
lout Controlled and Normal 0 6131 568 0 0 0.915 -
Malicious 0 5431 1268 0 0 0.811 -
logit Normal 1194 174 421 444 0.739 0.613 0.729
Controlled 0 2068 165 0 0 0.93 -
Malicious 132 1317 321 463 0.291 0.649 0.222
log-linear Normal 984 274 631 344 0.609 0.563 0.741
Controlled 36 1702 129 366 0.218 0.778 0.090
Malicious 115 1392 338 388 0.254 0.675 0.229
Table 5: Confusion matrix of the Anomaly Detection model
Attack TP TN FN FP SEN ACC PREC
None 1757 286 20 170 0.989 0.915 0.912
A1 36 2139 58 0 0.383 0.974 1
A2 33 2190 10 0 0.767 0.996 1
A3 69 2151 13 0 0.841 0.994 1
A4 49 2184 0 0 1 1 1
A5 0 2232 1 0 0 1 -
A6 43 2190 0 0 1 1 1
A7 56 2089 88 0 0.389 0.961 1
5.2 Residential demand response: behaviour model and anomaly detection
Residential demand response is maturing from a concept to real-world applications, and it is
considered a significant resource of localized flexibility. In particular in cases where the heat
and cooling needs of buildings are satisfied by electric heating or heat pumps. As demand
response is maturing from a vision to real-world applications, it is also becoming a potential
target for cyber attacks. A real-time demand response system can be viewed as a cyber-physical
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system: a physical structure, yet with a behaviour that is strongly ICT-dependent. Therefore,
there should be physical (non-ICT based) indicators of anomalous behaviour. In this work we
investigate the observable characteristics of individual households consumption behaviour with
respect to real-time demand response.
The demand response behaviour is partly governed by physical properties of the process,
partly by autonomous behaviour of residents, and in part by the local control systems, which
may be parametrized by local users. Combined this leads to new challenges for reliability and
security of operation, as the required open control systems also offer more entry points for
cyber-attacks.
The data analysis reported a wide variety of typical behaviours, which indicated that anomalies
need to be identified in the characteristic time-domain response behaviour of an individual (or
group of) loads. The load response behaviour as modelled by the finite impulse response (FIR)
characterizes the behaviour. Consequentially, a change of this behaviour has been formulated as
criterion for anomalies. It has been shown that some information on characterizing the system
response could be extracted, and an intuitive interpretation of extracted parameters may be
given. The identification of behavioural abnormalities in demand response data was expected
to be challenging, and so it is not surprising that the accuracy of anomaly detection has not
been convincing.
The main innovations of the presented approach are:
• method and metrics to define similarity of response characteristics based on FIR,
• the demonstration of a continuously identified the price responsiveness of individual
households.
This online system requires about 12-24 hours to fully converge from one behaviour characteristic
to another, behavioural anomalies may be discovered more quickly. The results form this work
are to be published in in scientific conference.
Title: Behaviour Signatures of Residential Demand Response applied to Cyber-physical
Anomaly Detection
Authors: Kai Heussen, Emil Tyge and Anna Magdalena Kosek, Energy System Operation
and Management, Department of Electrical Engineering, Technical University of Denmark
Publication: This work has been submitted for publication at a relevant scientific conference.
A major part of this investigations has been carried out in context of a student project at DTU
and on the basis of a data set obtained by the EcoGrid.eu project [9].
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Abstract—The shift from centralised large production to dis-
tributed energy production has several consequences for current
power system operation. The replacement of large power plants
by growing numbers of distributed energy resources (DERs)
increases the dependency of the power system on small scale,
distributed production. Many of these DERs can be accessed
and controlled remotely, posing a cybersecurity risk. This paper
investigates an intrusion detection system which evaluates the
DER operation in order to discover unauthorized control actions.
The proposed anomaly detection method is based on an ensemble
of non-linear artificial neural network DER models which detect
and evaluate anomalies in DER operation. The proposed method
is validated against measurement data which yields a precision of
0.947 and an accuracy of 0.976. This improves the precision and
accuracy of a classic model-based anomaly detection by 75.7%
and 9.2%, respectively.
Keywords—Data-driven modelling, machine learning, cyber-
physical security, model-based anomaly detection, ensemble regres-
sion, power system.
I. INTRODUCTION
Power systems are critical infrastructures for industry, trans-
portation, health care, water and food supply, telecommunica-
tion and financial systems. Cybersecurity in power grids is a
topic of increasing concern [1], and a considerable effort is
required to secure the infrastructure from cyber-attacks. This
includes securing legacy systems and designing new systems
with security in mind [2]. The discipline of cybersecurity an-
alyzes threats, vulnerabilities and risks for computing systems
and proposes defense mechanisms [3]. Initially, cybersecurity
in power systems has focused on communication standards [4]
including Advanced Metering Infrastructure [5], and SCADA
security [6]. More recently, a new type of approach has been
used which takes the cyber-physical nature of power systems
into account, i.e. the interaction between the physical power
system and the ICT infrastructure used in its operation (e.g.
[7]).
Cybersecurity measures can be categorized along the time
domain as preventive, real-time or post-mortem. Intrusion de-
tection systems (IDS) gather and analyze the information from
a computer network or system in order to discover malicious
activities or violations of policy. Two general types of detection
techniques are used in IDS: anomaly-based or signature-based.
Current IDS focus on the analysis of software and network
traffic, but do not usually take the physical component of
a cyber-physical system into consideration. In this paper we
investigate an intrusion detection method based on physical
component models. Using the example of a photovoltaic (PV)
generator as the potential target of a cyber-attack [2], we
analyze operational data to detect anomalies in its operation
which may be further classified as resulting from unauthorized
or malicious control inputs.
In the data mining context, anomaly detection is concerned
with identifying rare data instances or events that do not
match an expected pattern. Applications include the detection
of financial fraud, identification of manufacturing faults and
monitoring of computers in data centers [8]. Three types of
anomaly detection techniques can be distinguished: supervised,
semi-supervised and unsupervised. Supervised methods use
a fully labelled training set to train a classification method
which distinguishes normal behaviour from different types of
anomalies. Semi-supervised methods (so called model-based
anomaly detection) use partially labelled data to create a
model of normal behaviour and compare the model output
to the observed network or system behaviour. Unsupervised
methods assume that the total number of anomalies is small
in comparison to the normal data points in the training set.
Based on this assumption, statistical anomaly based techniques
analyze operational data in order to distinguish between normal
and anomalous operation through statistical inference tests.
In this work we investigate model-based anomaly detection
for DERs. Anomaly detection with a single regression model
has been used for PV fault diagnostics [9], wind turbine fault
detection [10], and discovering cyber-attacks on SCADA [6].
In [9], the authors use redundant linear and non-linear models
to detect different faults in PV operation. Anomaly detection
in control systems with use of a linear model of the normal
behaviour is investigated in [11]. Contextual anomaly detection
was used in a cyber-physical IDS (Intrusion Detection System)
to detect malicious voltage control actions [12]. Here, the
proposed on-line method utilizes a model which is trained on
data known to have no malicious control actions or sensor
faults, therefore the trained normal model is accurate.
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2This paper continues the work presented in [12]. The
proposed method recognises anomalies in pre-recorded data of
DER operation; it therefore focuses on post-mortem analysis,
detecting past occurrences of control events. The contribution
of this paper is as follows: a) a novel model-based anomaly
detection method using ensemble regression, in section II-A; b)
a new method for selecting model training set to improve the
anomaly detection performance, in section II-B; We further
verify of the proposed method against the DER operation
data, in section IV and perform quantitative comparison of
the proposed method against single model anomaly detection,
in section VI.
II. CYBER-PHYSICAL INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM
The concept of a cyber-physical intrusion detection system
(CP-IDS) was proposed in the SALVAGE project [13] as
presented in figure 1 [12]. The CP-IDS uses data from the
observed cyber-physical system and analyses it under three
aspects: DER operation, power system vulnerability and cyber-
security threat. The outcome of this analysis is passed to a
cyber-physical analysis component. Here, all three aspects are
combined into a joint cyber-physical security assessment.
Fig. 1. Cyber-physical IDS architecture [12].
Work presented in [12] is an on-line power system and
component analysis for the purpose of discovering malicious
voltage control events. In this paper we focus on the DER
analysis component of the CP-IDS and propose a method for
off-line (post mortem) DER control detection. In this context,
four operational states of a DER can be distinguished:
• Normal operation: a DER behaves as expected and its
operation is not influenced by external set points. An
internal DER controller may or may not govern the
operation of the unit.
• Faulty operation: the operation of a DER deviates from
normal due to a fault at the unit or in its electrical
network environment.
• Verified control: a DER behaves as expected under
a verified control scheme, or according to authorized
external set points.
• Malicious control: a DER is operated under an unverified
control scheme or according to unauthorized external set
points.
In this paper we define a DER behaviour anomaly as either
verified or malicious control, and consider faulty operation
as part of normal DER operation to exclude it from the
detection algorithm. After an introduction to model based-
anomaly detection in section II-A we describe data cleaning
and selection in section II-B and model training in section
III. We present a model based anomaly detection method with
ensemble regression models in section V and apply it to a PV
plant data set in section IV. In section VI we compare this
approach to several single model approaches and evaluate the
method for selecting model training set.
A. Model-based anomaly detection
In the proposed model-based anomaly detection method,
normal DER behaviour is modelled in the DER model com-
ponent (figure 2). The output of the model is compared to
sensor measurements (or target data) in the Anomaly Detection
component. Differences between normal and observed DER
behaviour can originate form several sources: sensor error,
model error, DER fault, or malicious or verified DER control.
The output of the model-based anomaly detection is either a
label (class) or an anomaly score for every data input.
Fig. 2. Flow diagram of the model-based anomaly detection
Ensemble learning combines several models to produce
a prediction to solve classification and regression problems
[14]. The increased robustness and accuracy of ensemble
methods over single model methods was reported in [15].
Ensemble learning consists of three steps: generation, pruning
and integration. First several redundant models are generated,
then the set of models is pruned by removing some of the gen-
erated models, finally the base model results are combined to
create the ensemble prediction [14]. An overview of ensemble
regression approaches for generation, pruning and integration
are presented in [14]. The ensemble is evaluated by the degree
of agreement between predictions represented by their overall
spread. The ensemble prediction is usually evaluated in terms
of an average of the individual predictions (mostly using equal
weight averaging).
Fig. 3. Ensemble model-based anomaly detection architecture.
The proposed ensemble model-based anomaly detection
(EM-AD) uses two or more DER normal behaviour models
which produce the same output variables based on disjoint sets
of inputs. The additional Model merging component calculates
the final model output that is next compared to the observed
output in the Anomaly detection component.
In this paper we apply the EM-AD method to a PV
component and implement it as a proof of concept, using
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3historical time series of power and meteorological measure-
ments obtained from a PV plant. The model building method
is presented in section II-B.
B. Model building
The semi-supervised anomaly detection uses partially la-
belled data to train the normal model. Since the historical data
has not been labelled, we use correlation analysis as a method
for selecting a training set to improve the normal model and
consequently enhance the anomaly detection performance. The
chosen model building stages are as follows: data cleaning,
aggregation, data scoring with correlation analysis, model data
labelling and selection, removal of missing values, normaliza-
tion, ANN model creation with supervised model training.
Fig. 4. The proposed model building method.
Figure 4 shows the data preparation and model building
processes. The following section describes these processes in
detail.
1) Data cleaning: Data cleaning detects and removes errors
and inconsistencies in data in order to improve its quality
[16]. In this paper, the observations of modelled phenomena
are produced by sensors. Many errors can be hidden in raw
sensor data; therefore the data needs to be cleaned before it can
be used for modeling and analysis. The classification of data
quality problems in data sources was proposed in [16]. Accord-
ing to this classification, the data can originate from a single
measurement unit (single-source) or several measurement units
(multi-source). Single source problems include schema and
instance level issues. The schema level issues can be addressed
with the mechanism of data storing and its integrity constrains.
Instance-specific problems cannot be prevented at the schema
level and include word misspellings and sensor errors. Multi-
source data quality issues are consequences of integrating mul-
tiple sources of data. Resulting from conflicts due to different
data models and representations, overlaps and contradictions
can appear in the integrated data. In this work we consider both
singe and multi-source data quality issues. In section IV-B of
this paper we focus on single-source instance problems and
will not cover sensor errors and multi-source instance level
problems considering inconsistent timing.
2) Aggregation: The aggregation process targets two issues:
model training time and missing values. Firstly the aggregation
decreases the amount of the data that need to be processed to
train the model, reducing the computation time for the model
training. Secondly the column-wise aggregation based on mean
or average on a matrix with some missing values (represented
as NA) uses all available information from partially missing
data samples. This process allows integrating the partially
missing samples into the data set without removing them.
3) Correlation analysis: The analysis of data correlation
serves two purposes: filtering data for the normal behaviour
model and discovery of sensor faults. This data selection step
is based on the assumption that the output of the model is
correlated to one or more of its features. In this work we use
the standard Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient
of two variables. The proposed correlation analysis takes a
defined subset of features and the model output and calculates
its total correlation. Let x(j,k)i = {x(j)i , x(j+1)i , ..., x(j+k)i }
be a subset starting from sample j ∈ N0 of size k ∈
N1, where k <= n, of the ith feature, and y(j,k) =
{y(j), y(j+1), ..., y(j+k)} is a variable that is the matching
subset starting from sample j of size k of the output. The
correlation Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient
corr(x
(j,k)
i , y
(j,k)) is calculated as follows:
corr(x
(j,k)
i , y
(j,k)) = cov(x
(j,k)
i , y
(j,k))/(δx
(j,k)
i δy
(j,k)) (1)
Where cov(x(j,k)i , y
(j,k)) is the covariance of variables xki
and yk, and δx(j,k)i and δy
(j,k) are their respected standard
deviations. The correlation calculated in equation 1 serves as
a normality score for model data selection.
4) Model data selection: Samples of all features from
the training set are evaluated based on the calculated cor-
relation score. The proposed method allocates a sample
(x
(j,k)
i y
(j,k)) into one of two groups: normal behaviour and
suspicious behaviour. For a chosen α ∈ [0, 1], samples with
corr(x
(j,k)
i , y
(j,k)) > α are allocated to normal behaviour
group. If corr(x(j,k)i , y
(j,k)) <= α or if corr(x(j,k)i , y
(j,k))
does not exist, the samples are allocated to the suspicious be-
haviour group and are removed from the training set. Note that
the correlation cannot be calculated if the standard deviation of
x
(j,k)
i or y
(j,k) is zero. In this case the correlation is assigned a
NA value. In sensor data this kind of feature can be observed
for periods with long sensor failures.
5) Normalization: Vector normalization or scaling is usually
performed before ANN model fitting. In this work normalisa-
tion was used. This is done to adjust values used for training
by scaling them into the set [0, 1]. Large differences between
values in the training set have an influence on the model
weights which affects the model’s ability to learn and aids
generalization [17].
III. ANN MODEL CREATION
An artificial neural network (ANN) is a machine learning
algorithm used to estimate unknown functions depending on
several parameters. An ANN consists of interconnected neu-
ronal nodes which perform simple calculations on outputs from
neighbouring nodes in the previous layer. The result is passed
to the next layer of the network.
We consider an ANN with n ∈ N1 input variables x =
[x0, x1, x2, ..., xn]
>, where xn ∈ R, and x0 = 1 is a bias unit.
The output variable of the considered ANN is y ∈ R. Let a(j)i
be the activation of neuron i in layer j, where j ∈ 1, 2, .., l,
and l is the number of layers. Θ(j) is a matrix of weights
controlling the function mapping from layer j to layer j + 1.
The considered hypothesis function approximated by the ANN
is hΘ(x) ∈ R. Any layer Lj of the ANN consists of sj neurons
a(j) = [a
(j)
0 , a
(j)
1 , a
(j)
2 , ..., a
(j)
sj ]
>. The size of the layer j can
be different for every hidden layer. The input layer L1 is of
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4size n, corresponding to the features vector. The output layer
L3 is of size 1 since the considered hypothesis function is
hΘ : R
n → R. The neural network architecture, including
the number of inputs, outputs, layers and neurons in each
layer, as well as the selection of the transfer function, describes
an artificial neural network. Supervised learning methods for
training ANN use the training examples x0, x1, x2, ..., xn, y
to calculate weight matrices Θ(1),Θ(2), ...,Θ(l−1). The neural
network architecture and the calculated weight matrices are
jointly used for the approximation of an unknown function
representing the relationship between input features and output
variables. This way an artificial neural network can be trained
to approximate transfer functions, especially unknown non-
linear relationships.
A. ANN model training
The next step of data processing is the creation of an ANN
model from the data by supervised training. The ANN training
method chosen for training is called feed-forward training
method (or forward propagation). Let’s consider an ANN with
l ∈ N1 layers, n ∈ N1 inputs, one output, a single set
of model features x = [x0, x1, x2, ..., xn]> and the output
variable y ∈ R . Each layer L consists of Sl neurons. The
neuron activation function is the sigmoid function, as defined
in equation 2.
g(z) = 1/(1 + e−z) (2)
The Cyberenko theorem proves that the sigmoid function
fulfills the universal approximation theorem which states that a
single layer feed-forward artificial neural network can approx-
imate continuous functions. The sigmoid activation function
is therefore used to add non-linearity to the artificial neural
network.
The forward propagation algorithm takes the vector x as an
input and assigns it to the first layer a(1), therefore a(1) = x.
Neurons a(2), a(3), ..., a(l) can be constructed with the follow-
ing vectorised equations: ∀j ∈ [2, l] a(j) = g(Θ(j−1)a(j−1)).
The matrices Θ(1),Θ(2), ...,Θ(l−1) are model weights. Θ(j)
is a matrix of weights controlling the function mapping from
layer j to layer j + 1, for any j ∈ (2, l), additionally
Θ(j) ∈ Rsj+1×sj+1. Because the layer Ll is an output
layer, hΘ(x) = a(l), therefore the hypothesis in the forward
propagation algorithm is as follows:
hΘ(x) = g(Θ
(l−1)g(Θ(l−2)...g(Θ(1)x))) (3)
Forward propagation takes the features x1, x2, ..., xn
and modifies them with matrices Θ(1),Θ(2), ...,Θ(l−1)
and the sigmoid function g to create better suited fea-
tures a(1), a(2), ..., a(n). In order to calculate the matrices
Θ(1),Θ(2), ...,Θ(n−1), the cost function J with least-squares
fitting is described as follows:
J(Θ) =
1
2n
n∑
i=1
(hΘ(x
(i))− y(i))2 (4)
In feed-forward ANN, the problem of over-fitting can be
solved with regularization [18] which is used to minimise the
Θ(1),Θ(2), ...,Θ(l−1) weights of the model. The cost function
J with regularization is as follows:
JR(Θ) =
1
2n
n∑
i=1
(hΘ(x
(i))− y(i))2 + λ
2n
l−1∑
k=1
Sl∑
i=1
Sl+1∑
j=1
(θ
(k)
i,j )
2
(5)
where Sl is a number of units without a bias unit in the
layer, λ is a regularization parameter called weight decay, and
θ
(k)
i,j is an element of the matrix Θ
(k). Ripley [18] suggests
to use λ = 10−4 − 10−2 as a regularization parameter for
least-squares fitting.
By minimising the cost function JR(Θ), the ANN model
weights Θ(1),Θ(2), ...,Θ(l−1) can be computed. The Broy-
den–Fletcher–Goldfarb–Shannon (BFGS) algorithm [19] is
used for solving the unconstrained nonlinear optimization
problem of minimising the cost function JR(Θ). While the
BFGS algorithm is not guaranteed to converge, the Hessian
matrix can be inspected in order to check if a secure local
minimum has been found. There are many solutions to the
optimisation problem and the weights are initialised at random
at the start of the process, therefore the results might differ.
IV. PV MODEL ENSEMBLE GENERATION
The DER modeling process presented in section II-B is
applied to a data set from a single PV inverter at the SYSLAB
laboratory at the Technical University of Denmark. Two differ-
ent models, a meteorological and a neighbourhood model, are
presented in sections IV-C and IV-D and used in the EM-AD
(section V).
A. Data sources
The data used for this study has been recorded from a
10kWp PV array located in Risø, Denmark in October 2014.
The active power consumption data is recorded from the
inverter in 1 second intervals. Meteorological data at the same
time resolution - irradiation, temperature, wind speed and
direction - is obtained from a meteorology mast about 600
m away from the PV site.
The data cleaning and preparation procedure presented in
section II-B is used to pre-process the data before the ANN
model can be trained. Since all presented models use the same
data for training, the process of data cleaning is identical.
B. Data preparation
In this paper we focus on single-source instance problems
removing discovered sensor errors and multi-source instance
level problems considering inconsistent timing. Easily ob-
served sensor failures result in missing data or false measure-
ments. In the considered data set the observed false measure-
ments were either constant values or inconsistent values, for
example negative solar irradiation. Inconsistent value errors
were present in the data set due to a sensor logging error.
The threshold between consistent and inconsistent values is
determined manually and inconsistent values are removed with
the first filtering step.
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5TABLE I. DATA PROPERTIES OF SOLAR IRRADIATION (12.10.2014).
Data Min. 1st Q Median 3rd Q Max. NA’s
Recorded -31.450 -0.001 -0.001 0.014 31.450 0
Filtered -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.015 0.087 4543
In the second filtering step, a 3rd order Butterworth low
pass filter has been used to remove high frequency components
appearing in the data due to sensor errors. The properties of
the recorded and filtered data is presented in table I. Both the
first and the third quadrant did not change significantly after
the filtering process. The median remained the same, therefore
it can be concluded that mostly outliers have been removed
from the data set. This filtering process removed around 5%
of the irradiation data set. Once the data is clean and uniform
it can be aggregated to 1-minute values. The resulting time-
series is then randomly divided into 3 sets: a training set Dt
of size 14841, a validation set Dv of size 14901, and a cross-
validation set Dcv of size 14898 samples.
C. Meteorological model
The meteorological model is based on the assumption that
meteorological data can be used to model the yield of a PV
panel. The available meteorological data (solar irradiation,
wind speed, wind direction, ambient temperature) was used
to construct the PV production model. The input significance
analysis of the linear model based on the same inputs and
outputs as the presented model, using test statistics under the
null hypothesis, shows that all inputs are significant.
1) Model data selection with correlation analysis: The
correlation between irradiation and yield data from the training
set Dt was calculated using equation 1 with k = 44640
corresponding to a single day (see figure 5). The data set was
extended with the normality score which is equal to the daily
correlation. All data points with a score larger or equal to 0.2
were included in the normal behaviour model.
Fig. 5. Correlation analysis for irradiation, active power production from
PV319 and PV715 with active power from PV117.
All data points for which the correlation could not be
calculated due to zero standard deviation, were excluded from
the training set. Based on correlation analysis, training data
was selected for the ANN meteorological model, excluding
data recorded on the 8th and 23-26th of October (figure6).
From the initial size of 14841, correlation analysis decreases
the size of the training set Dt to 12480 rows. After excluding
all rows where any of the data points is NA (removed by data
cleaning), the size of the actual training set becomes 11739
rows. In the next step of the data preparation process, the
training set is normalized.
Fig. 6. Meteorological model normal training data set.
2) Model training: The proposed ANN network consists of
5 input neurons (representing solar irradiation, wind speed,
wind direction, ambient temperature and time of day), one
hidden layer with 10 neurons and a bias unit. The network
has a single output neuron (PV117 power production) and 71
weights. The used transfer function g is sigmoid (as in equation
2) and the regularization parameter λ is set to 0.0006. The
package nnet (Feed-Forward Neural Networks and Multino-
mial Log-Linear Models) [18] for the R scripting language has
been used for the creation of the supervised learning ANN
model. The nnet package calculates the Θ parameters of a
single-hidden layer neural network, as described in section
III-A. The model output for each input is presented in figure
Fig. 7. Actual and predicted PV117 power consumption mapped to the inputs
of the ANN meteorological model.
7. The root mean square error (RMSE) is calculated in order
to evaluate the model. The RMSE for the training set is 1.13
versus 1.116 for the validation set and 1.118 for the cross-
validation set. The small difference in RMSE between the
validation and cross-validation sets indicates that the model
generalises well.
D. Neighbourhood model
The proposed model uses data from two neighboring PV
systems to take advantage of correlations between the three
systems. In the SYSLAB laboratory the distance between
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6PV117 and PV715 is 630m, compared to 340m between
PV117 and PV319. In this investigation PV117 is being mod-
elled. The correlation between the active power productions of
PV117, PV319 and PV715 is calculated by using data from the
training set Dt and equation 1 with k = 44640, corresponding
to a single day (see figure 5). All days with a correlation larger
Fig. 8. Neighbourhood model training data with days selected by the
correlation analysis in blue.
or equal to 0.2 have been included in the model. In this case,
the 2nd, 4th, 8th, 13-15th, 21st, 23-26th and 30th of October
have been removed from the training set. After the correlation
analysis, the size of the training set Dt decreased from 14841
to 8201 samples.
The proposed ANN network consists of 3 input neurons
(PV715 and PV319 power production and time of day), one
hidden layer with 8 neurons and a bias unit. The network
has a single output neuron (PV117 power production). The
used transfer function g is sigmoid (as in equation 2) and
the regularization parameter λ is 0.0006. Similarly to the
meteorological ANN model, the R package nnet is used to
find the Θ parameters of the model, as described in section
III-A. The output of the model compared to its input with
use of data from the validation set is presented in figure 9.
The RMSE for the training set is 0.96, versus 0.570 for the
Fig. 9. Actual and predicted PV117 power consumption mapped to the model
inputs for ANN neighbourhood model.
validation set and 0.572 for the cross-validation set. The small
difference in RMSE values between the validation and cross-
validation sets indicates that the model generalises well.
V. EM-AD FOR A PV PLANT
The architecture of the EM-AD is presented in figure 10.
Sensor data of solar irradiation, wind speed, wind direction,
ambient temperature, hour of day and power consumption
of two neighbouring PVs (PV319 and PV715) are used as
input. The proposed ensemble regression is composed of two
regression models. The models were generated from disjoint
parameter sets and a contextual parameter (hour of day),
creating redundant heterogeneous ANN regression models of
active power production as presented in sections IV-C and
IV-D. The ensemble model set was not pruned because the
set contains only two models. The ensemble integration is
usually calculated as a linear combination of the predictions
[14]. Here the ensemble power prediction P ′ is calculated
from predictions for each model PN and PM as follows:
P ′ = αPN + αPM , where α = 1/2 corresponds to equal
weight averaging.
Fig. 10. Architecture of the proposed PV ensemble regression model anomaly
detection (EM-AD)
The ensemble prediction P ′ is weighted with the anomaly
score in the anomaly evaluation component. The anomaly
score is based on the correlation analysis for both ANN models
as presented in figure 5. Partial anomaly scores aM and aN
are calculated for both models as in equation 6.
a =
{
1 corr ≥ 0.2
10 corr < 0.2
(6)
The anomaly score as combines the partial scores for the
models aM and aN and is calculated as as = 1/(aM ·aN ). The
anomaly score as is multiplied by the difference between the
ensemble prediction P ′ and measured power P to calculate the
anomaly a = as · (P ′ − P ). The chosen anomaly threshold is
 = 0.1, therefore only observations with a >  are considered.
VI. RESULTS
In the considered scenario one month of the historical active
power production of a single PV plant is analysed. In the anal-
ysed period of time the PV should have not been controlled,
the considered anomalous cyber event is curtailment of the
PV active power production to zero. The cyber event is being
discovered by the proposed EM-AD, in this section we present
the anomaly detection results for the EM-AD and compare it
to other anomaly detection techniques.
The degree of agreement between the ensemble predictions
is given by their overall spread (s = PN − PM ) with the
first and third quadrant at -0.011 and 0.006, respectively, and
a standard deviation of 0.511. This indicates that the models
generally agree in their predictions. Table II presents nine
approaches for model-based anomaly detection which were
performed using the October 2014 PV data set. The evaluated
models are M (meteorological), N (neighbourhood), MN (joint
model with inputs from M and N), EMN (ensemble of M
and N). The used training sets are: cor (correlated days for
the data set), full (entire data set). Two anomaly detection
SALVAGE: Cyber-physical security for low-voltage grids [2014-2017]
SALVAGE D2.2: [6 Appendix A] page 27 of 35
7TABLE II. RESULTS CONFUSION MATRIX AND STATISTICAL MEASURES
Model Train AD TP TN FP FN ACC PPV NPV FNR TPR TNR FPR FDR
M full M-AD 1198 37445 4531 1466 0.866 0.209 0.962 0.550 0.450 0.892 0.108 0.791
M cor M-AD 1633 41305 671 1031 0.962 0.709 0.976 0.387 0.613 0.984 0.016 0.291
N full M-AD 1543 39242 2734 1121 0.914 0.361 0.972 0.421 0.579 0.935 0.065 0.639
N cor M-AD 1736 41660 316 928 0.972 0.846 0.978 0.348 0.652 0.992 0.008 0.154
MN full M-AD 764 38723 3253 1900 0.885 0.190 0.953 0.713 0.287 0.923 0.077 0.810
MN cor M-AD 764 41756 220 1900 0.953 0.776 0.956 0.713 0.287 0.995 0.005 0.224
EMN full M-AD 1447 38730 3246 1217 0.900 0.308 0.970 0.457 0.543 0.923 0.077 0.692
EMN cor M-AD 1709 38614 3362 955 0.903 0.337 0.976 0.358 0.642 0.920 0.080 0.663
EMN cor EM-AD 1709 41880 96 955 0.976 0.947 0.978 0.358 0.642 0.998 0.002 0.053
methods are used: M-AD (model based anomaly detection)
and EM-AD (ensemble regression model anomaly detection).
The confusion matrix is a compilation of instances of true
positives (TP), true negatives (TN), false positives (FP) and
false negatives (FN), evaluated from a population of results. To
measure the correctness of the anomaly detection we calculate
eight significant measures: accuracy (ACC), precision (PPV),
negative predictive value (NPV), false negative rate (FNR),
sensitivity (TPR), specificity (TNR), false positive rate (FPR)
and false discovery rate (FDR).
The proposed EM-AD with the correlation training selection
approach achieves an accuracy of 0.976, which improves the
accuracy by 0.4-11.1% for single model AD, 2.3-9.2% for joint
model AD, and 7.3-7.6% over the method without correlation
ensemble integration. The precision of the proposed method is
0.947, which improves the precision by 23.8-73.8% for single
model AD, 10.1-58,6% for joint model AD, and 61-63.8% over
the method without correlation ensemble integration. EM-AD
with correlation training data selection additionally keeps low
values for FNR of 0.358, FPR of 0.002 and FDR of 0.053.
While the specificity has improved only by 10.6% at best,
totalling to 0.998, the sensitivity is 0.642 which presents an
improvement of up to 35.5% over other presented methods.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a novel ensemble model anomaly de-
tection method with non-linear regression models and anomaly
scores based on correlation analysis (RM-AD) used for cyber-
physical intrusion detection in smart grids. The models are
presented and evaluated and the ensemble integration and
anomaly detection methods are described in detail. A proof-
of-concept RM-AD analysing a data set from a PV plant is
presented and compared to other M-AD approaches. Future
work will include automatic ensemble model set generation,
an investigation into whether a larger ensemble can improve
the prediction accuracy, and alternative interpolation methods
for missing data.
This research was conducted as part of the SALVAGE
project (Cyber-physical security for low-voltage grids) funded
by ERA-Net Smart Grids.
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Abstract—This paper presents a contextual anomaly detection
method and its use in the discovery of malicious voltage control
actions in the low voltage distribution grid. The model-based
anomaly detection uses an artificial neural network model to
identify a distributed energy resource’s behaviour under control.
An intrusion detection system observes distributed energy re-
source’s behaviour, control actions and the power system impact,
and is tested together with an ongoing voltage control attack in a
co-simulation set-up. The simulation results obtained with a real
photovoltaic rooftop power plant data show that the contextual
anomaly detection performs on average 55% better in the control
detection and over 56% better in the malicious control detection
over the point anomaly detection.
Keywords—anomaly detection, intrusion detection system, smart
grid, data analysis, cyber-physical security
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber security is an increasing interest and worry in power
systems. The main concerns consider new control paradigms,
on-line access to a range of power system components and
DERs (Distributed Energy Resources), and enormous data
exchange and collection introduced by the so called Smart
Grid. The power system security is mostly concerned with
cyber security of AMI (Advanced Metering Infrastructure),
[1], SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) se-
curity [2] and communication standards [3]. A new cyber-
physical approach to the smart grid security was introduced
in [4] and addresses a tight coupling between the physical
power system and the ICT (Information and Communication
Technology). Nine major research topics emerged from the
combination of these two fields: vulnerability research, impact
analysis, mitigation research, cyber-physical metrics, data and
model developments, security validation, interoperability, cy-
ber forensics and operator training [5]. A smart grid compatible
IDS (Intrusion Detection System) needs to address both on-
line and post-mortem analysis of the state of the observed
cyber-physical system and detect anomalies in operation of
both cyber and physical components. An anomaly detection
method identifies rare data instances or events that do not
match an expected pattern [6]. The development of models
used for anomaly detection requires cyber-security and power
system expertise, and additionally, if data driven models are
required, data analysis knowledge. Once both cyber and phys-
ical anomaly detection analysis is performed, cyber-physical
metrics need to be developed to combine the information
from both domains to address the tight relations between the
power system and the ICT domains. Anomaly detection with
regression models has been used for discovering cyber-attacks
on a SCADA system [7], a wind turbine fault detection [8], a
PV (photovoltaic power plant) fault diagnostics [9]. A special
case of a PV attack against voltage control in distribution
power grids has been described in [10].
Two types of anomaly detection can be distinguished: point
and contextual. The point anomaly detection takes the global
view of the data [6]. The contextual or conditional anomalies
were introduced in [11] and are defined as data points that
are anomalous in a specific context and acceptable in another
context. For example for spatial data, the location of a measure-
ment is its context. For time series, time is the context for each
measurement [6]. The advantage of the contextual over point
anomaly detection is the detection accuracy. The disadvantage
is that this method requires context data, which is not always
available. Two methods for contextual anomaly detection exist:
reduction to a point anomaly detection problem and utilizing
the structure in data [6]. The reduction to point anomaly
detection problem technique divides the data into contextual
groups and analyses behaviour attributes for each context
separately, reducing the problem to several point anomaly
detections. Thos method produces a model for each context,
as a consequence several models are used to represent a single
system. In case of the time contextual data, models for every
year, month, day of the month, minute and so on would have to
be created. Contextual anomaly models utilising the structure
of the data modify the structure the training data to include the
date adding separately: year, month, day and so on as input
variables, the modified input data is then used for training of
a single contextual model.
In the energy domain the contextual anomaly detection
have been previously used for recognising user behavior in
a residential dwelling based on non-parametric belief propa-
gation for energy efficiency [12]. In [12] a user behaviour is
categorised as unusual equipment usage or bursty occupancy
and is used to adjust the energy management schedule. Authors
978-1-5090-1164-3/16/$31.00 c©2016 IEEE
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2in [13] propose use of on-line contextual anomaly detection
for fault diagnostics of power transformers. In this paper
we propose to use contextual anomaly detection utilizing the
structure in data for cyber-physical IDS. According to the
author’s knowledge, contextual anomaly detection have not
been used to identify control actions.
II. ANOMALY BASED IDS
The proposed cyber-physical IDS architecture consists of
two main parts: an analysis of the behaviour of the observed
cyber-physical system and components, and a joint analysis of
the cyber-physical system (figure 1). The behaviour analysis
and characterisation of the physical power system is performed
with two components: DER and power system analysis, the
evaluation of the cyber vulnerabilities is performed in the
cyber security analysis component. The joint cyber-physical
analysis combines the information from both physical and
cyber security components and presents the outcomes to the
power system operator. In this work we consider the physical
Fig. 1. Cyber-physical IDS architecture.
part of the proposed IDS and focus on DER and power system
analysis. Additionally this paper introduces an on-line method
to combine information produced by these components in
the cyber physical analysis component. The proposed on-line
anomaly based IDS architecture is presented in figure 2. The
IDS consists of three parts: DER, power system and cyber-
physical analysis.
Fig. 2. IDS with anomaly detection and power system stability evaluation.
A. DER analysis
The objective of the DER analysis is to identify a suspicious
behaviour of a DER unit and associate it with a DER control
action. The DER analysis consists of: a DER model, a control
detection mechanism and an anomaly classification. In order to
detect if a DER is being controlled, an anomaly in its behaviour
need to be discovered. An anomaly based detection uses a
normal behaviour model predicting a DER power production or
consumption (P ′) and compares it to the power measurement
from the DER (P ). The difference between these values is
identified as anomaly α = P ′−P . Since the model introduces
errors to anomaly detection, a threshold τ = 0.1 was chosen
to eliminate some of the model errors. Additionally this paper
considers controllable power production (when P is negative),
where curtailment is the only possible control action, therefore
all positive α > 0 are treated as an error. The final anomaly c
associated with a curtailment action is as follows:
c =
{
1 α > τ
0 α ≤ τ (1)
The anomaly classification checks if the discovered anomaly
is within the possible DER operation time β, therefore:
β =
{
1 P ′ < 0
0 P ′ ≥ 0 (2)
The anomaly classification produces output k = cβ identify-
ing all significant and possible curtailments of a DER, here
classified as control anomalies k.
B. Power system analysis
Power system analysis consists of two components: impact
evaluation and malicious impact detection. The impact evalua-
tion depends on the attack hypothesis, in this paper the consid-
ered attack influences the power stability by causing under- or
over-voltage. The impact analysis takes under consideration the
voltage limits and creates a piece-wise function u evaluating
measured voltages U . Let’s consider n as the nominal voltage
value and 0.9n is considered under-voltage and 1.1n is over-
voltage, the proposed function is as follows:
u(U) =

1 U ≥ 0.9n
−20n(x− 0.9n) 0.9n < U < 0.95n
0 0.95n ≤ U ≤ 1.05n
20n(x− 0.05n) 1.05n < U < 1.1n
1 U ≤ 1.1n
(3)
The impact evaluation function u is presented in figure 3. The
Fig. 3. Impact evacuation function.
output of the impact evaluation function is used in malicious
impact detection component that evaluates the voltage differ-
ence udiff for each time t: udiff = ut−1 − ut. The output of
the malicious impact detection component udiff is a measure
of the state of the voltage from one point in time to another.
If the udiff is positive, when ut−1 > ut, the voltage have
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3improved between time t − 1 and t. If the udiff is negative,
when ut−1 < ut, the voltage have changed and is closer to
under- or over-voltage between time t− 1 and t. If the udiff
is equal to zero, the voltage have not significantly changed, it
might have changed inside of the ±0.05n range or have not
changed at all. The impact classification m is as follows:
m =
{
1 udiff < 0 ∪ (udiff = 0 ∩ u = 1)
0 otherwise
(4)
The impact is classified as malicious if the voltage has changed
towards under or over-voltage. Additionally, we assume that
the malicious impact occurs in case the under or over-voltage
is present and that this state didn’t change between time t− 1
and t.
C. Cyber-physical analysis
Cyber-physical analysis evaluates the recognised anomalies.
The DER analysis provides the control evaluation k, the
power system analysis component brings the malicious impact
evaluation m and impact estimation u. In this work, we focus
on the following three control anomaly cases: normal control,
when m = 0, u = 0 and k = 1; suspicious control, when
m = 1, u > 0 and k = 1; and malicious control, when
m = 1, u = 1 and k = 1. The proposed anomaly based IDS
and its three main analysis components have been tested in
simulation, the implementation and results are presented in
sections III, IV and V.
III. DER MODEL
This paper proposes use of contextual anomaly detection
for DER analysis and evaluates its use on an example DER: a
residential rooftop PV panel. The time is used as a contextual
attribute for PV production prediction as shown in figure 4. The
anomalous behaviour is defined as PV’s response to a control
signal resulting in curtailment of its power production. The
model input data is described in section III. Several modeling
Fig. 4. Contextual anomaly detection with a PV mode.
approaches can be used to model a normal behaviour of a PV
or any other DER. Three types of popular models are white,
gray and black box models [14]. White box models use the
known physical properties of the system. Gray box model
and black box models both use the available system input
and outputs to determine the system model. Gray box model
combines a partial theoretical structure or partial physical
system model and use model training methods to estimate
parameters. In the black box model, only inputs and outputs
of the system are know and the operation of the system
is unknown. Machine learning methods are used to identify
properties of the system by supervised model training. The
black box model of a DER might be less accurate than a white
box model, but can be adjusted to any unknown DER, that need
to be observed and modelled. In this paper we investigate the
use of machine learning technique, specifically artificial neural
network (ANN), to model a DER. PV arrays have been previ-
ously modelled with use of ANN [15]. In the context of power
system ANN was used together with anomaly detection in only
in few cases: distribution feeder fault detection [16], detecting
anomalies at substation level of abnormal measurements [17].
The design of the PV model presented in this paper is based on
availability of input data for its training. Similar PV models
have been proposed in numerous publications, for example
a PV model using irradiation, ambient temperature, voltage,
active power and current training set was proposed in [18].
According to author’s knowledge no other contextual ANN
PV models have been developed, where time is considered as
a context.
A. Model training data
1) PV power production data: The real PV production data
was recorded by the Pecan Street Smart Grid Demonstration
Program project that started in 2010. The objective was to
implement an open platform Energy Internet Demonstration
[19] with real residential consumers. The primary sight of the
demonstration was at Austins Mueller community in Austin,
Texas. One of the project outcome is a Dataport1 database
containing anonymized data of home electricity use, PV power,
EV charging, and demand response data recorded while partic-
ipating in the utility programs. The PV active power production
was recorded by an energy monitoring system from eGauge.
The considered solar power production used in this research
is a rooftop PV produced by SunEdison, from a single-family
home (referred in Dataport as house 774) in Austin, Texas. The
data used in this research is 1 minute active power production
in kW from 1st January 2013 to 31st January 2014.
2) Meteorological data: The Meteorological data was ac-
quired from National Solar Radiation Data Base (NSRDB)2
developed by NREL (National Renewable Energy Laboratory).
The used data comes from a meteorological station in Texas,
Austin (latitude 30.29, longitude -97.7) from 1st January 2013
to 1st February 2014. The data is recorded every 30 minutes,
the chosen data points, defined in the Glossary of Solar
Radiation Resource Terms 3, are as follows. Diffuse Horizontal
Irradiance (DHI) [w/m2] (diffuse sky radiation) - the radiation
component that strikes a point from the sky, excluding circum-
solar radiation. Direct Normal Irradiance (DNI) [w/m2] (beam
radiation) - the amount of solar radiation from the direction of
the sun. Global Horizontal Radiation (GHI) [w/m2] (global
horizontal irradiance) total solar radiation. Three measures of
clear sky irradiance: clear sky diffuse horizontal irradiance,
direct normal radiance and global horizontal radiation (C-DHI,
C-DNI and C-GHI) [w/m2] - measurement of DHI, DNI and
GHI excluding the influence of clouds. Cloud type (CloudT)
1https://dataport.pecanstreet.org/
2https://nsrdb.nrel.gov/
3http://rredc.nrel.gov/
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4is another available meteorological data, NSRDB records 13
cloud types: clear, probably clear, fog, water, super-cooled
water, mixed, opaque ice, cirrus, overlapping, overshooting,
unknown, dust, smoke. Additional meteorological information
are ambient temperature (Temp) [c], wind direction (WindD)
[Degrees], and wind speed (WindS) [m/s].
3) Contextual attributes: The time stamp from each mea-
surement was transformed into a vector M,D, h,m, where
M ∈ [1, 12] is a month, D ∈ [1, 31] is a day, h ∈ [0, 23] is
an hour and m ∈ [0, 59] is a minute. The relationship between
contextual attributes (hour and month) and power production is
presented in figure 5. For the purpose of this study, the training
set was combined from the weather and PV production data
together with the time information from 1st January 2013 to
31st December 2013. A total of 525540 data rows were divided
into 80% training set (420660 data rows) and 20% validation
set (104880 data rows). Before the 30 minute meteorological
data was combined with 1 minute power production and time
data, linear interpolation was performed on the weather data.
This training set was used for the PV model training. The data
from 1st January 2014 to 31st January 2014 was used in the
simulation as on-line data. The PV production data used for
simulation was modified in order to simulate PV control. In
the simulation, an instantaneous and constant curtailment is
assumed.
Fig. 5. Box plot of time of the day and month, and PV power production.
B. ANN models
Let’s consider a single layer feed-forward ANN with n ∈ N1
inputs, one output, and a single set of model features x =
[x0, x1, x2, ..., xn]
> and output variable y ∈ R . The hidden
layer consists of h ∈ N1 neurons. In order to train the ANN,
the forward propagation algorithm is used. The ANN model
hypothesis is as follows:
Hw(x) = w0 +
∑
h
w1hφ(αh +
∑
k
wkhxi) (5)
Here, w is model weights, φ0 is the output function and φ1
is the activation function. In this work the neural network is
build to model a non-linear continuous function. According
to Cyberenko theorem, sigmoid activation function of a single
layer feed-forward ANN fulfills the universal approximation
TABLE I. COMPARISON OF THE DEVELOPED MODELS
Model Residuals
Name Prm Ctxt prm RMSE Min Median Max
ANN-P 10 - 0.88 -3.82 -0.14 4.25
ANN-C 14 m, D, H, M 0.43 -3.11 0 3.81
theorem, therefore a ANN with sigmoid activation function,
as in equation (6), can approximate continuous functions.
φ(z) = 1/(1 + e−z) (6)
The weights are chosen to minimise the cost function with least
squares. In forward-feed ANN problem of over-fitting can be
minimised with regularization [20], that is used to minimise the
weights of the model, the cost function J with regularization
is as follows:
J(w) =
∑
i
||Hw(x(i))− y(i)||+ λ
∑
h
∑
k
w2kh (7)
Ripley [20] suggests to use λ = 10−4 − 10−2 as a regular-
ization parameter for least-squares fitting. Broyden-Fletcher-
Goldfarb-Shanno (BFGS) algorithm [21] was used for solving
unconstrained nonlinear optimization problem of minimising
the the cost function J(w).
The point ANN model (ANN-P) consists of 10 input neurons
15 hidden neurons and one output neuron. The regularization
parameter λ = 0.0006. The contextual ANN model (ANN-
P) consists of 14 input neurons 20 hidden neurons and one
output neuron. The regularization parameter is λ = 0.0006.
Both numbers of the hidden neurons and the regularization
parameter for each model were chosen to minimise the root
mean square error (RMSE) of the model prediction. As pre-
sented in table I the ANN-C model is more accurate than the
ANN-P model based on RMSE.
IV. SIMULATION
A co-simulation set-up was used to obtain results in this
paper. The co-simulation 4 combines the PV, house and meteo-
rological station emulators, power load flow solver PYPOWER
part of the MATPOWER package for Python, implementation
of monitors and attacker. Open source co-simulation orchestra-
tor mosaik5 synchronises the operation of all simulations and
programs and exchanges data between them. Two scenarios
were chosen to demonstrate the IDS system presented in
section II. Both scenarios consider operation a LV distribution
grid and consists of two feeders with houses and rooftop
PVs. For each scenario two use cases are presented: normal
operation and under attack. Use cases test hypothesis that an
attacker controls PV operation in order to influence voltage on
the line, leading to reduction of power quality. An autonomous
monitor with IDS proposed in this paper observes each PV
plant and tests the scenario hypothesis. The objective of the
monitor in each use case is to determine if the PV control leads
to over- or under-voltage on the line. According to EN50160
European standard the nominal value of voltage in LV grid is
4https://pypi.python.org/pypi/PYPOWER
5http://mosaik.offis.de/
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5Fig. 6. System configuration for Scenario I and II.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
Fig. 7. Scenario I: house and PV load pattern (a) and voltage (b)- normal
behaviour; house and PV load pattern (c) and voltage (d)- behaviour under
attack; (e) voltage difference between the normal behaviour and the attack.
230v, over-voltage is defined as 10% increase of the nominal
voltage (253v), under-voltage is 10% decrease of the nominal
voltage (207v). In this section we present monitoring results
from a single PV (refereed to PV number 744 in [19]). Two
types of monitors: contextual and point anomaly detection have
been implemented in the co-simulation set up.
Scenario I considers 100% residential PV penetration. The
system configuration used for this scenario consists of 40
houses and PVs, divided into two feeders 12 sets of houses
and PVs on feeder A and 28 sets of houses and PVs on
feeder B (see figure 6). Ten houses and corresponding PVs
have been created from real house data III-A1 and replicated
to create 40 prosumers. The actors in the normal operation
use case are: houses, PVs, monitors and an aggregator. The
aggregator reads the voltage from each PQbus (connection
point to the grid from both house and the PV) and curtails the
PV in case the voltage is reaching over-voltage. The outcome
of the aggregator operation is presented in figure 7(a). In total
45 minutes of the operation voltage problems are visible (30
minutes over-voltage and 15 minutes under-voltage). In the
use case under attack, the actors are as follows: houses, PVs,
monitors and an attacker. The attacker gathers information
about the active power production of each PV and voltage
on each PQbus. The attacker sends control signals to each PV
in order to reach either under or over-voltage. It is visible in
figure 7(c) that the attacker’s decision was not to curtail the
PV operation and increase over-voltage, as presented in 7(d).
The voltage problems increased to 240 minutes (where 225
minutes of over-voltage and 15 minutes of under-voltage). The
difference between voltages for the normal operation and the
attack use case is presented in figure 7(e), it is visible that the
voltage is mostly decreased in this scenario.
In Scenario II 50% of the houses are equipped with rooftop
PVs. The system configuration for this scenario is as follows:
it consists of 40 houses and 20 PVs are divided into two
feeders 12 houses and 5 PVs on feeder A and 28 houses and
15 PVs on feeder B (see figure 6). Similarly to the normal use
cases from Scenario I, the aggregator is controlling the PV in
order to meet the voltage limits, as presented in figures 8(a,b).
There are several voltage problems: 15 minutes of over-voltage
and 135 minutes of under-voltage. In the attack use case, the
attacker is aiming at increasing the over- and under-voltage
minutes by controlling the PV. It is visible in figure 8(c) that
attacker decides to curtail the PV744 to 0kW , which leads to
a decrease in voltage. The total number of voltage problems
is increased to 420 which all minutes are under-voltage. The
voltage difference between use cases in the Scenario II is
presented in figure 8(e). It is visible that voltage have been
significantly decreased in this scenario.
V. RESULTS
Two presented models are tested for each use case in two
scenarios. The results are divided into accuracy of the control
detection and overall results of the malicious control detection.
A confusion matrix and accuracy calculations are used to eval-
uate the control and attack results. The confusion matrix is a
collection of occurrences of true positives (TP), true negatives
(TN), false positives (FP), false negatives (FN) evaluated from
a population of results. The accuracy is calculated as follows:
Acc = (TP + TN)/(TP + FP + FN + TN) (8)
As seen in table II, the accuracy of the control action detection
for point detection ranges between 0.39 and 0.58, where
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Fig. 8. Scenario II: house and PV load pattern (a) and voltage (b)- normal
behaviour; house and PV load pattern (c) and voltage (d)- behaviour under
attack; (e) voltage difference between the normal behaviour and the attack.
contextual anomaly accuracy is between 0.79 and as much
as 0.94 for attack use case in Scenario II. Both methods
recognised less control actions during attack in Scenario I
than in Scenario II. On average the accuracy of detection
for the contextual method increases by 0.37 over the point
method that accounts to 55% in the presented scenarios. As
presented in table III, the discovery of malicious control is
performed well by both point and contextual detection, scoring
0.99 or 1 accuracy. For the attack in Scenario II both methods
have 0.93 accuracy. However the attack case of the Scenario
I is more problematic or both methods however, contextual
anomaly recognised 4 times more true positives than point
anomaly detection, increasing the accuracy by 56%.
VI. CONCLUSION
An on-line IDS detecting malicious DER control two attack
on voltage scenarios in the LV grid is described and tested
in this paper. The IDS consists of a DER analysis with a
contextual anomaly detection and a power system analysis with
an impact analysis. The simulation results obtained from the
TABLE II. CONFUSION MATRIX OF CONTROL DETECTION
Use case TP TN FP FN Acc
contextual anomaly
Scenario I: normal 2033 5956 218 1873 0.79
Scenario I: attack 6 8863 1208 3 0.88
Scenario II: normal 2034 5956 218 1872 0.79
Scenario II: attack 3498 5953 213 416 0.94
point anomaly
Scenario I: normal 1770 2194 3980 2136 0.39
Scenario I: attack 9 5498 4573 0 0.55
Scenario II: normal 1466 2194 3980 2440 0.36
Scenario II: attack 3693 2194 3972 221 0.58
TABLE III. CONFUSION MATRIX OF MALICIOUS CONTROL DETECTION
Use case TP TN FP FN Acc
contextual anomaly
Scenario I: normal 0 45 0 0 1
Scenario I: attack 44 15 0 181 0.25
Scenario II: normal 0 150 0 0 1
Scenario II: attack 249 141 0 30 0.93
point anomaly
Scenario I: normal 0 45 0 0 1
Scenario I: attack 11 15 0 214 0.11
Scenario II: normal 0 149 1 0 0.99
Scenario II: attack 249 140 1 30 0.93
chosen scenarios confirm that a contextual anomaly detection
is more accurate than point anomaly detection.
In the present implementation the IDS analysis in limited
to a simple voltage use case. A more broad analysis modules
need to be added for other power system malicious control.
The presented DER model is calculated from the near past
historical data, in the next implementation the model needs to
be recalculated periodically or be based on a large set of data.
The presented IDS is designed to a local produce the IDS only
associated with a control of a single DER. If the underlying
model is recalculated periodically the ANN training execution
complexity should be considered. Additionally the presented
co-simulation set-up allows implementation of different attack
profiles, future work can include implementation of different
attack profiles.
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